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FAIR TRIAL/FREE PRESS-Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart: Defining the Limits of Prior
Restraint in the Trial by Newspaper Controversy
There is something radically, flagrantly wrong in the conduct of
most newspapers in the United States. . . . [Tihe right of reputation . . . is habitually violated. .

.

. [The press] has become

putrescence putrified.1
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field.
Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record
of service over several centuries.2
The conceivable tension between the first and sixth amendments
to the Constitution-between the guarantees of freedom of the press
and the right of an accused to a fair trial-is emphatically embodied
in the expression "trial by newspaper." This tension surfaced as
early as the trial of Aaron Burr for treason, 3 continued through the
sensationalized trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the murder of the
Lindbergh baby,' and persists to the present day. The conflict is
inevitable. Within the context of a criminal trial, the Court has
repeatedly confronted these valid and competing concerns without
reaching a constitutionally defined accomodation. In Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart,5 the Court has again grappled with the
constitutional boundaries of the first and sixth amendments and
has attempted to resolve the fair trial/free press debate. The decision delimits the areas of future conflict by defining permissible
methods which can be used to guarantee fair trial.
In reaching its decision the Court sought to avoid the "absolutist"
position, i.e., giving full effect to one constitutional right in derogation of the other. In rejecting this viewpoint, the majority refused
to establish priorities between the two amendments.7 Their goal was
1. THE NEWSPAPER PRESS AND THE LAW OF LIBEL, I SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD quoted in Geis, PreliminaryHearingsAnd The Press, 8
UCLA L. REV. 397, 408-09 (1961).
2. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
3. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692g).
4. See Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REV.
453 (1940).
5. 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
6. A vigorous champion of the freedom of the press, Mr. Justice Douglas best illustrates
the vantage point of those absolutists in the area of first amendment freedoms: "The press
has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
7. The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 8

to develop a middle ground where the courts and the press could
cooperate in the administration of criminal justice. This article will
attempt to define this middleground after discussing past case law
governing the fair trial/free press controversy and articulating possible future delineations of the relationship between the rights of the
defendant and those of the public via the press.
NEBRASKA:

THE FACTUAL CONTEXT

On October 18, 1975, six members of the Henry Kellie family were
brutally murdered in their home in a small farming community in
Nebraska. The following morning, when Erwin Charles Simants was
arrested and charged with the murder, a barrage of publicity, both
local and national, began.8 Three days later, recognizing the future
difficulty in impanelling an impartial jury if the publicity continued, both the defense and prosecuting attorneys requested restrictions on mass media coverage. The court granted the joint motion
by prohibiting the release of any testimony or evidence to the public
and by requiring the media to observe the Nebraska Bar-Press
Guidelines.' Simants' preliminary hearing was open to the public
but was subject to the court's "gag" order.
Petitioners, several newspaper and broadcast associations, moved
for leave to intervene in the state district court, seeking to vacate
the restrictive lower court order. Petitioners were granted leave to
intervene but the district court judge found a "clear and present
danger" to the defendant's right to a fair trial and entered his own
gag order. This order prohibited the news media from reporting on
five specified subjects until a jury could be impanelled.10 Like the
between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as superior
to the other. . . . [11f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware of the potential
conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning
to one priority over the other, it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined.
96 S.Ct. at 2803-04.
8. 96 S.Ct. at 2794-95. In a similar case involving a highly publicized murder, a state
appellate judge commented:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in this case in such
a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy. . . Circulation-conscious
editors catered to the insatiable interest of the American public in the bizarre.
State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 294, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910
(1956).
9. 96 S.Ct. at 2795. The guidelines are a voluntary code adopted by the Nebraska bar and
press which govern the reporting of criminal trials. For a complete text, see 96 S.Ct. at 282930 (Appendix A).
10. The district judge's order prohibited petitioners from reporting on:
(1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement
officers, which had been introduced in open court at arraignment; (2) the fact or
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lower court's order, the state district court order also incorporated
the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines.
The Nebraska Supreme Court was then asked to stay the district
court's order. The court refused to lift the ban but modified the
lower court's order by reducing the prohibited subjects to three and
voiding the requirement of compliance with the Nebraska Bar-Press
Guidelines." The order, as modified, prohibited reporting on:
(a) the existence and nature of any confessions or admissions
made by the defendant to law enforcement officers;
(b) any confessions or admissions made to any third parties,
except members of the press; and
(c) other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused.' 2
Before the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Mr.
Justice Blackmun, in his capacity as Circuit Justice, twice refused
to stay the gag order, as expressed in the state district court's order
and then as stated by the Nebraska Supreme Court.'"
THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE

To address the important issues raised in connection with the
Nebraska Supreme Court order, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari." After first determining that the case was "capable of repetition, yet evading review" and therefore not moot,'" a
nature of statements Simants had made to other persons; (3) the contents of a note
he had written the night of the crime; (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony
at the preliminary hearing; (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual
assault and the nature of the assault.
96 S.Ct. at 2795.
11. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 805 (1975). The Nebraska
Supreme Court explained its decision to limit the scope of the gag order in the following
manner:
We conclude that the order of the District Court of October 27, 1975, is void insofar
as it incorporates the voluntary guidelines and in certain other respects in that it
impinges too greatly upon freedom of the press. The guidelines were not intended
to be contractual and cannot be enforced as if they were.
12. Id.
13. In the first instance, Mr. Justice Blackmun declined to issue a stay of the state district
court's gag order as it appeared that the petitioners' application to the Nebraska Supreme
Court was then being considered by that court. Mr. Justice Blackmun thought it desirable
that as the issue involved an order by a Nebraska state court, it be resolved in the first
instance by the Supreme Court of that state. 423 U.S. 1319 (1975). One week later, the
Nebraska Supreme Court having still taken no action, Mr. Justice Blackmun reconsidered
the petitioners' application and, while refusing to stay the order entirely, he did grant a
partial stay at least insofar as it incorporated the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Mr. Justice
Blackmun however, refused to prohibit the Nebraska courts from placing any restriction
at all on the media. 423 U.S. 1327 (1975).
14. 423 U.S. 1027 (1975). In granting certiorari, the Court refused petitioners' application
for a full stay of the Nebraska Supreme Court's gag order.
15. 96 S.Ct. at 2797. In the interim, defendant Simants had been convicted of murder and
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unanimous Court held that the gag order was a prior restraint which
infringed the freedom of the press guaranteed in the first amendment. The order was accordingly declared invalid."6
The Court recognized the problems arising out of highly publicized criminal trials and acknowledged the prejudicial consequences
of trial by newspaper. However, after reviewing several notorious
past cases, the Court concluded that "pretrial publicity-even pervasive adverse publicity-does not inevitably lead to an unfair
trial."' 7 The issue was not whether there existed a real danger to the
defendant's right to a fair trial, but rather whether under the circumstances of this case the means employed to protect the defendant's rights were foreclosed by another provision of the Constitution.'"
The Court characterized the Nebraska Supreme Court's order as
a prior restraint invading the first amendment. The temporary nature of the order did not alleviate its severity nor mitigate the constitutional infringement."' In addition, the conclusion of the trial judge
that publicity would adversely affect potential jurors was deemed
speculative 0 and the use of this extraordinary legal method to curb
the allegedly harmful publicity was considered ineffectual. 2' Finally, and most importantly, the availability of other, less severe,
alternatives open to the trial judge weighed heavily in the Court's
decision invalidating the restrictive order.
While this restrictive order was struck down as a prior restraint,
the Nebraska Court did not preclude the issuance of some type of
gag order in the future:
However difficult it may be, we need not rule out the possibility
sentenced to death. His appeal was pending in the Nebraska Supreme Court.
16. Id. at 2808.
17. Id. at 2800.
18. Id. at 2801.
19. Id. at 2803.
20. Id. at 2804. The Court, in holding that the effect on the jurors was speculative, pointed
to the existence of a large number of unknowns-the amount of publicity which the crime
would receive prior to the time a jury was selected and sequestered, the nature of that
publicity, and how that publicity might affect the jurors selected to serve. The Court emphasized that in dealing with these unknowns, the trial judge could only base his conclusions as
to the publicity's adverse effect on "common human experience."
21. Id. at 2805. In holding that the gag order was of improbable efficacy, the Court found
it significant that the Nebraska Supreme Court had made no finding that alternative measures would not have protected Simants' rights. As for the Nebraska Supreme Court's implication that alternative measures might not be adequate, the Court could find no evidence in
the record to support such a finding.
22. Id. at 2805.
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of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess
the requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint."3
The decision does mandate that other less restrictive alternatives be
given primary consideration in order to limit the possibility of conflict between the defendant's fair trial protections and the freedom
of the press. These alternatives include change of venue,
continuance, more extensive voir dire, cautionary instructions and
sequestration of the jury. In addition to these possibilities, the Court
cited with approval the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press.2" These standards permit the trial judge to exclude the public from all or part of pretrial
hearings, to use within a limited scope the court's contempt power,
and to allow the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial. In
extreme cases, the ABA recommends that the court consider the
possibility of reversing a conviction because of prejudicial publicity. 25 An examination of the alternatives suggested by the Court in
Nebraska and those promulgated by the ABA will reveal the varying
degrees of effectiveness as well as possible drawbacks to their application.
FAIR TRIAL PROTECTIONS SHORT OF PRIOR RESTRAINT: AN ANALYSIS

The methods employed to guarantee a fair trial can be analyzed
and explored in three distinct categories: (1) traditional court procedures such as those cited by the Supreme Court in Nebraska and
suggested by the ABA; (2) the extraordinary remedy of the contempt power, mentioned only by the ABA; and (3) those methods
which have only a possibility of future realization, i.e., proposals by
various commentators attempting to achieve that elusive constitutional balance between the first and sixth amendments to the Constitution.
Traditional Guarantees of a Fair Trial
Proceeding in order of trial chronology, the closed preliminary
hearing is one of the first options available to a court to ensure the
defendant a fair trial. The Supreme Court has long recognized this
pretrial proceeding as the most crucial stage for the accused in
23. Id. at 2808. But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan where he states
that no prior restraints ought to be tolerated in press coverage of criminal trials. 96 S.Ct. at
2809-28.

24. ABA
1968).
25.

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS

Id. at 73-74. See text accompanying notes 46 through 52 infra.

(Approved Draft,
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relation to mass media coverage.2"
Preliminary hearings in the United States have normally been
open to the public except for limits set by the judge on matters
involving minors, sexually-related offenses, and other similarly
"indelicate" affairs. 7 However, under the influence of the Field
Code28 a number of states incorporated a provision in their criminal
codes which allowed the defendant in a criminal trial the right to
insist upon a closed preliminary proceeding.29 Although only five
states still retain this provision, 3° it is a right of the defendant which
most courts recognize. 31 The Supreme Court in Nebraska recognized
possible first amendment problems inherent in a closed preliminary
32
hearing but failed to rule on the constitutional merits of that issue .
The fact that pretrial proceedings have generally been open to the
public (and by definition, to the press) is traceable to the historical
fear and distrust created by secret trials 33 and to the benefits
34
thought to be derived from the open character of the proceedings.
See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965), where the Supreme Court noted:
Pretrial can create a major problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed,
it may be more harmful than publicity during the trial for it may well set the
community opinion as to guilt or innocence.
27. See Geis, PreliminaryHearings and the Press, note 1 supra, at 407.
28. N.Y. Laws 1848.
29. Field's personal antipathy towards the press was extreme. He once described the
action of newspapers in their reporting of a recent trial as similar to that of "cormorants over
a carcass." David Dudley Field quoted in Geis, PreliminaryHearings and the Press, note 1
supra, at 408 (1961).
30. The five states which retain this right in their codes of criminal procedure are: California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West) (1954); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 19-811 (1947); Montana,
MONT. REV. CODES § 95-1202 (1967); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.204 (1975); and Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-13 (1953).
31. See State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115 (1969); State ex rel. Kennon v.
Hanley, 249 Wis. 399, 24 N.W.2d 683 (1946); and People v. Harris, 302 Ill. 590, 135 N.E. 75
(1922).
32. Closure of pretrial proceedings with the consent of the defendant when
required is also recommended in guidelines that have emerged from various studies.
At oral argument petitioner's counsel asserted that judicially imposed restraints on
lawyers and others would be subject to challenge as interfering with press rights to
news sources. . . . We are not now confronted with such issues.
96 S.Ct. at 2805 n.8.
33. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948), where the Court noted:
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of the practice by the Spanish Inquisition, to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber, and to the French monarchy's abuse
of the lettre de cachet. . . . Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused
that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee
has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts
as instruments of persecution.
34. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965), where the Court stated:
Clearly the openness of the proceedings provides other benefits as well: it arguably
improves the quality of testimony, it may induce unknown witnesses to come for26.
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Despite the advantages of a public hearing, however, courts have
increasingly viewed the right to a public trial as the right of the
defendant, and thus a right which he may waive. For example, the
Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas" was faced with a situation where
the trial court had declined to grant defendant's request to bar the
news media from the preliminary hearing. Consequently, the hearing was carried live on television and radio. In holding that the
defendant had been denied due process, the Supreme Court emphasized that the right to a public hearing belonged to the defendant:
[Tihe guarantee of a public trial confers no special benefit on the
press. . . . [Tihe concept of public trial cannot be used to defend
conditions which prevent the trial process from providing a fair
trial and reliable determination of guilt."5
The right of a defendant to waive a public preliminary hearing
does not, of course, reduce or correct the problem of pretrial publicity when it occurs on a scale like that in Nebraska. Although the
press may be barred from the courtroom, the media has not been
prevented from revealing prejudicial evidence or statements by the
defendant. In addition, there exists the possibility that the secrecy
of the proceedings will encourage rumors and speculation. The ineffectiveness of the closed preliminary hearing may force the trial
court to consider another traditional method of assuring the accused
a fair trial-the granting of a continuance.
In granting a continuance, the trial judge allows the deluge of
publicity to subside. This guarantees the accused a trial at a time
when public emotion, and press coverage, are no longer at their
height. This method would appear to preserve the defendant's fair
trial right in its purest form. However, two drawbacks to this approach immediately become apparent. First, a continuance cannot
totally counteract the publicity once it has occurred. In a case like
Nebraska which generates substantial community interest of the
prurient type, it is extremely doubtful that a continuance, no matter how lengthy, is a useful remedy for the defendant. Second, as
one commentator has pointed out, moving for a continuance deprives the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial and
ward with relevant testimony, it may move all trial participants to perform their
duties conscientiously, and it gives the public the opportunity to observe the courts
in the performance of their duties and to determine whether they are performing
adequately.
35. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
36. Id. at 583.
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also deprives the sovereign of its right to a quick administration of
justice. 7
Still another alternative open to a trial judge endeavoring to ensure a fair trial is the granting of a change of venue. This important
alternative was recognized by the Supreme Court in Rideau v.
Louisiana.3 1 There, the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant
who was denied a change of venue. Failure to grant the defendant's
motion, under the circumstances, was deemed a denial of due process.39 Although the Court normally does not presume that a fair
trial can be obtained in the wake of prejudicial publicity, failure of
a defendant to request a change of venue may be considered an
indication that the affected party did not feel threatened by the
adverse press coverage. Absence of such a motion has led the Court
to uphold a conviction."
The importance of a change of venue was recognized by the Court
in Irvin v. Dowd4 where it held that a state statute which allowed
only one change of venue must, under certain circumstances, be
disregarded in favor of the right of the accused to a fair trial.4" In
applying this principle the Nebraska Court determined that the
state law restricting changes of venue to adjacent counties must
yield to the constitutional requirement that the state afford the
43
defendant a fair trial.
Although change of venue has been considered an important option for the defendant, criticism has been levelled at this method of
securing a fair trial, as well. In light of the possibility of state-wide
and national mass media coverage in addition to the pervasive local
publicity, change of venue, whether granted one or a dozen times,
may be an exercise in futility. Similarly, a change of venue deprives
the defendant of his constitutional right to a speedy trial in the
37. See Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal,57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 217, 235 (1962).
38. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
39. Id. at 726 (showing of a film containing defendant's confession to armed robbery and
murder on local television prior to the selection of a jury was a denial of due process).
40. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). In this rather remarkable case, defendant's conviction for first degree murder was upheld despite the fact that before and during
his trial, various headlines and the text of news stories referred to the defendant as a "werewolf," a "fiend," and a "sex-mad killer." It was also upheld despite the fact that the district
attorney had announced to the press his belief that defendant was guilty and released to them
details of defendant's confession before defendant's preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court
in upholding the conviction found it significant that the defendant had failed to request a
change of venue.
41. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
42. Id. at 721.
43. 96 S.Ct. at 2805 n.7.

19771

Fair Trial/Free Press

county where the alleged crime was committed." In addition, the
problems inherent in the use of a continuance become aggravated
by the transfer of defendant's case outside his community. Not only
is his speedy trial right jeopardized, but he may no longer be able
to impanel jurors from his socio-economic class.
Other traditional, less restrictive alternatives to prior restraint
include those remedies aimed at achieving a jury panel that is relatively insulated from the tide of public opinion-the voir dire process, cautionary instructions and sequestration of the jury. These
three jury-related procedures-vital to the trial judge in normal
circumstances-become indispensable when the court is faced with
the threat of adverse publicity. Indeed, when the Supreme Court
reverses a conviction for failure to afford the accused a fair trial due
to prejudicial publicity, it is commonly a result of the failure of the
trial judge to exercise his quasi-absolute authority over the courtroom.45 An example is afforded by Irvin v. Dowd,46 where the Court
found that the trial judge did not conduct a proper voir dire examination. Out of a panel of 430, 268 prospective jurors had a fixed
opinion as to guilt. Eight of the twelve selected jurors admitted they
thought the defendant was guilty, although each indicated he could
reach an impartial verdict. The Court, while reluctant to impose a
requirement that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues
involved, found that the proper degree of impartiality was not attained by the trial judge.47
In a few instances, this abdication by the trial judge of his authority over the jury and proceedings reached almost grotesque proportions. For example, in Sheppard v. Maxwell,4" a trial noted for its
"carnival atmosphere,"4 9 names of the jurors were publicized three
weeks before the trial began. As a result, several jurors received
threatening letters and phone calls. Thus, the effects of the pretrial
44. See Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, note
37 supra, at 235 (1962).
45. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (jury allowed direct and indirect contact
with news media throughout trial proceedings); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (trial judge
failed to conduct a proper voir dire); United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962)
(jury exposed to newspaper publicity concerning defendant's alleged mob connections).
46. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
47. In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961), the Supreme Court noted:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice" shown to be present throughout
the community .
was clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. . . .The influence
that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights
detachment from the mental processes of the average man.
48. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
49. Id. at 358.
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publicity were exaggerated by the jury's exposure to community
pressures. Once the trial began, 20 newsmen were seated close to the
jury in a courtroom area normally inaccessible to the public. A
broadcasting station was allocated space outside the courtroom next
to the jury room. The jury was not sequestered prior to their deliberations and had full access to all news media. The trial court made
only "suggestions" and "requests" that jurors ignore press coverage
of the case. 0 The Supreme Court severely chastized the trial judge
for this extreme failure to isolate the jury:
The court's fundamental error is compounded by the holding
that it lacked power to control the publicity about the trial. From
the very inception of the proceedings the judge announced that
neither he nor anyone else could restrict prejudicial news accounts ...
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided
since the courtroom5 and courthouse premises are subject to the
control of the court. 1
The power of the judge over his courtroom, and in particular, over
the jury, is admittedly limited by practicality. For instance, in using
voir dire and cautionary instructions, the trial judge might only
strengthen the impression already established in the juror's mind by
the prejudicial publicity. Sequestration of the jury also poses a
problem in that it might backfire on the accused since jury hostility
might be aroused towards the "cause" of their isolation. The early
observation of Chief Justice Holmes casts some doubt on the effect
of all these precautions: "Any judge who has sat with juries, knows
that in spite of forms they are extremely likely to be impregnated
by the environing atmosphere. '"52
The last of these less restrictive alternatives to prior restraint of
the news media is the least appealing to the courts-reversal of a
conviction and the granting of a new trial. This unattractive and
burdensome alternative has become necessary because of the pervasive development of the mass media and its increasing influence in
today's society. More courts have grown to recognize the effects of
the media on the defendant's fair trial. As a result, courts are more
receptive to pleas for reversal due to prejudicial publicity at the trial
and pretrial stages. 3
50. Id. at 353-55.
51. Id. at 357-58.
52. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915).
53. The increasing number of reversals is a phenomenon noted with concern by the symposium conducted by Northwestern University School of Law and the Medill School of
Journalism. See generally FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL, A REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFER-
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In the Supreme Court, two standards have emerged to govern
reversals of convictions in cases involving prejudicial publicity. In
the federal courts, the rule has been stated in evidentiary terms and
based upon the Court's supervisory powers over the federal judiciary. In "trial by newspaper" cases arising in the state courts, the
standard for reversal has been enunciated in due process terms.
The rule for the federal courts was first articulated in Marshall
v. United States.54 In Marshall, the Court reversed a conviction
where the jurors had read articles containing information which was
not admissible as evidence at trial. The jurors stated that they were
not influenced by the additional evidence, but the Court emphasized that the reversal was not based simply on the inadmissible
nature of the evidence. Instead, the reversal was based on the preju55
dicial effect of the evidence on the jurors.
That Marshallwas based solely on the Court's federal supervisory
5 6 where the Court
powers became clear in Murphy v. Florida,
established the reversal standard for state court proceedings. In Murphy,
the Court adopted a stricter rule, requiring that the prejudicial
publicity amount to a violation of due process to warrant reversal."
Reversals of this kind are the last resort of the courts and for a
variety of reasons are not the preferred method of protecting the
accused's right to a fair trial. Reversals have little or no effect upon
the continued promulgation of prejudicial publicity. The effect of a
reversal on the news media is, at best, indirect and does not deter
further sensationalism. In addition to their ineffectiveness vis a vis
the press, reversals seriously threaten the maintenance of another
right-the right of the prosecution to the speedy administration of
justice. It is with these deficiencies in mind that the Court cautioned: "[Wie must remember that reversals are but palliatives;
the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.""
Contempt by Publication
Contempt by publication is not included among the traditional
methods because of its limited application and because it has generally been regarded with suspicion and hostility. A citation for conENCE ON PREJUDICIAL NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES
FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL].

54.
55.

360 U.S. 310 (1959).
Id. at 312.

56.

421 U.S. 794 (1975).

57.
58.

Id. at 797-98.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).

7-12 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
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tempt is an extreme remedy for it is an attempt by the judiciary to
exert authority beyond the courtroom as well as an attempt to directly restrain the press.
In Nebraska, the Court distinguished their fact situation from the
so-called "contempt cases." 5 However, some analysis of this
method of securing a fair trial is appropriate. In two respects, the
exerting of authority beyond the courtroom and the direct restraint
of the press, the power of a court to cite a newspaper for contempt
directly parallels the prior restraint in Nebraska. An examination
of the hostility engendered by the courts in their exercise of the
contempt power will greatly aid in understanding the ultimate failure of the gag order in Nebraska.
In England, once a suspect is arrested, any publication of confessions (whether admissible at trial or not), evidence bearing on guilt,
prior convictions, or disreputable associations and activities is considered criminal contempt. 0 An English statute, however, does
allow the press to be present and to report on the preliminary proceedings before the committing magistrate but does not allow comment on any evidence produced."
At an early date, the United States abandoned this English view
of the contempt power. In 1831, Congress passed the Federal Contempt Statute"2 which limits the summary contempt power of the
federal courts to "misbehavior [occurring] in its presence or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice." 3 There was
some question whether the words "presence" and "near" had been
used in the geographical or causative sense. Early authority understood the words in the causative sense and thus expanded the scope
of the court's contempt power. However, not since Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States," has the Supreme Court upheld a federal
court judgment of contempt by publication. In Nye v. United
States, 5 the Court construed the language of the Federal Contempt
Statute in the geographical sense, thereby strictly limiting the federal contempt power to situations involving "misbehavior in the
vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its business."6
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

96 S.Ct. at 2802 n.5.
See The King v. Parke, 2 K.B. 432 (1903).
Law of Libel Amendments Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict. c. 64, § 3.
Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 487, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
247 U.S. 402 (1918).
313 U.S. 33 (1941).
Id. at 52.
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A state court's power to hold individuals in contempt has also
been greatly curtailed by the "clear and present danger" doctrine.
This Supreme Court limitation on a court's authority was developed
in the so-called "contempt cases"-Bridges v: California,7
0
Pennekamp v. Florida,8 and Craig v. Harney."
Bridges involved the citation for contempt of a newspaper which
criticized a trial judge's actions in a pending trial. The Court rejected California's test for a determination of contempt, i.e., "any
tendency to obstruct the administration of justice" and instead applied the more rigorous "clear and present danger" test first enunciated in the free speech area.7 Justice Black, in his majority opinion,
cited the strength of the judiciary as part of the reason for applying
so stringent a test for contempt:
To regard it [the publication], therefore, as in itself of substantial
influence upon the course of justice would be to impute to judges
a lack of firmness, wisdom or honor-which we cannot accept as a
major premise.7
Pennekamp also involved judge-directed criticism. There the
publication accused the judge of favoring certain criminals and
gambling establishments. The trial court's standard for contempt
was any publication "tending to obstruct the fair and impartial
administration of justice." The trial court's contempt conviction
was struck down for failure to show a "clear and present danger."
The Court agreed that the publication contained half-truths and did
not state the facts objectively, but found this was insufficient to
72
warrant interference with freedom of the press.
In Craig, the Court extended the limitation placed on a state
court's contempt power. As in the earlier contempt cases, the publication involved criticism directed at the trial judge. Although the
criticism was of a particularly virulent strain and was aimed at a
layman only elected to the judiciary for a short time, the Court
persisted in relying on the strength of the judiciary and applied the
"clear and present danger" test:
But the law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges
who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

314 U.S. 252 (1941).
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
314 U.S. at 260-61.
Id. at 273.
328 U.S. at 347.
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supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hearty climate."3
The effect of these cases has resulted in a paucity of contempt
citations involving the media in state as well as federal courts. Since
the Craig decision, only one state conviction for contempt by publication has been upheld by an appellate court.74 The Court's attitude
toward the use of the contempt power has been severely criticized
by at least one commentator.7 5 However, it appears unlikely that
this method could ever become a useful weapon in the arsenal of a
trial judge. Even if contempt by publication were to be viewed
favorably by the Court, it would only be a futile exercise in revenge.
While a citation for contempt attempts to attack the prejudicial
publicity at its "inception," the damage has already been done. A
citation for contempt may restore or ensure the dignity of the trial
judge, but it does nothing to mitigate or prevent the influence of the
prejudicial publicity on the jury.
Techniques of Fair Trial Enforcement: Future Directions
It is apparent that the use of contempt by publication is an
extremely limited alternative of doubtful constitutionality which
provides little protection for the accused. Similarly, the more traditional, less restrictive methods of securing a fair trial also have
serious deficiencies. Recognizing the Supreme Court's increasing
annoyance with the conduct of the media,7" commentators, courts,
members of the bar, and concerned journalists have attempted to
establish codes (voluntary or otherwise) to govern the reporting of
criminal proceedings.
73. 331 U.S. at 376. This boundless confidence in the judiciary prompted the rather
discerning remark of Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "Judges are not merely the habitations of
bloodless categories of the law which pursue their predestined ends." 331 U.S. at 392 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
74. See People v. Goss, 10 Ill.2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385 (1957) (contempt conviction of a
television actor for comments made on his television show during the pendency of a divorce
action, upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court). See generally the discussion of Goss in FREE
PREss-FAIR TRIAL note 53 supra, at 25.
75. See Barist, The First Amendment And Regulation Of Prejudicial Publicity-An
Analysis, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 425 (1968), where the author takes a dim view of the Court's
idealism regarding the fortitude of a short-term judge in a political system.
76. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966), the Court expressed concern over
the prevalence of prejudicial news commentary:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment
on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. . . .Given the pervasiveness
of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from
the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused. (Emphasis added).
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Before examining the various codes and their effect on the fair
trial/free press controversy, reference should be made to H.L.
Mencken's observation: "Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine."" It is perhaps best to allow such healthy cynicism to temper
any reliance on these "cooperative" codes. The courts, members of
the bar, and representatives of the journalism profession will retain
differing opinions as to the relative merits of each side of this debate."8 However, the seemingly inherent impossibility of reconciliation has not prevented the rival groups from reaching some middleground.
Fairly typical of such voluntary codes is the Nebraska Bar-Press
Guidelines for Disclosure and Reporting of Information Relating to
Iminent or Pending Criminal Litigation. 7 These guidelines define
for the news media what the legal profession regards as prejudicial
material, inappropriate for publication at certain critical stages of
the trial proceedings. It covers such sensitive subjects as the existence or contents of confessions; opinions concerning the guilt of the
accused; statements predicting or influencing the outcome of the
trial; results of any tests conducted or the accused's refusal to submit to such tests; statements or opinions concerning the credibility
or anticipated testimony of prospective witnesses; and statements
made in the judicial proceedings outside the presence of the jury
which, if reported, would likely interfere with a fair trial. ° The list
is the result of the collective experience of courts and represents
factors which have, either alone or in combination, led various appellate courts to reverse a conviction because of prejudicial pretrial
or trial publicity.'
These voluntary codes represent what the legal community regards as an ideal in criminal reporting. It is just that, however, an
77. H. L. Mencken, quoted by Le Viness, Law and the Press, The Daily Record, Baltimore, March 11, 1932, at 3, col. 1, 4.
78. This divergence of purpose once led Harold Sullivan to explode:
Cite [for contempt] the owner, publisher, managing editor, directors of the
offending papers, those who have a voice in its policies, and a share of the profit
money flowing from such sordid conduct. Bring the full responsibility home to
where it properly belongs, to those who own, control, manage and profit by this
lawless enterprise.
H.

SULLIVAN,

TRIAL BY NEWSPAPER

65 (1961).

79. 96 S.Ct. at 2829-30 (Brennan, J., concurring, Appendix A).
80. Id. at 2829.
81. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (murder conviction reversed
due to prejudicial publicity which included opinions as to guilt); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 723 (1963) (showing of a film clip containing defendant's confession to armed robbery
and murder prior to trial); United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (conviction
for tax fraud reversed after jury exposure to newspaper publicity concerning defendant's
alleged mob connections).
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ideal. The practicalities of a diverse and ever-expanding news media
prevent any uniformity of code compliance. The codes also contain
no enforcement or penalty provisions which might give them substance. In fact, the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines take great pains
to stress that its rules or standards are purely voluntary. 2 It is this
apologetic attitude toward actual control of prejudicial news reporting which has led some to suggest a statutory solution to achieve a
constitutionally fair media coverage of criminal proceedings.
Initially, it appeared that codification would be the judiciallyfavored approach to the "trial by newspaper" question. In Bridges
v. California,the Court considered it significant that the legislature
had not enacted any statute to control publications commenting on
a pending case. This lack of legislative activity appeared to weigh
heavily in their decision against the validity of a contempt citation .' 3
Responding to this judicial challenge to develop statutory guidelines, several commentators outlined proposals designed to protect
the rights of the accused within permissible constitutional limits. 4
Generally, these proposed statutes follow the lines of voluntary
codes already in existence; however, some commentators have undertaken unorthodox approaches to this challenge8 5 These proposed
statutes, however, remain just that-proposals. No state legislature
82.

These voluntary guidelines reflect standards which bar and news media
representatives believe are a reasonable means of accommodating, on a voluntary
basis, the correlative constitutional rights of free speech and free press with the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They are not intended to prevent the news media
from . . . reporting on the integrity. . . of law enforcement, the administration of
justice, or political or governmental questions whenever involved in the judicial
process.
As a voluntary code, these guidelines do not necessarily reflect in all respects
what the members of the bar or the news media believe would be permitted or
required by law.
96 S.Ct. at 2829 (Appendix A) (Emphasis added).
83. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1941), where the Court noted:
[Hiere the legislature . . . has not appraised a particular kind of situation and
found a specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular
kind of utterance. The judgments below, therefore, do not come to us encased in
the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation.
84. See generally Barist, The First Amendment And Regulation Of PrejudicialPublicity-An Analysis, note 75 supra; Jaffe, Trial By Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 504 (1965);
Geis, Preliminary HearingsAnd The Press, note 1 supra; and Comment, The Case Against
Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and Proposal, note 37 supra.
85. One unique statutory proposal recommended a total ban on all non-public issue
publicity (as defined by the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964))
during the pretrial period. See Barist, The First Amendment And Regulation Of Prejudicial
Publicity-An Analysis, note 75 supra. Another potential radical approach involves an adoption of the English judiciary's propensity for the contempt citation in pretrial proceedings.
See Geis, Preliminary HearingsAnd The Press, note 84 supra, at 413.
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has actively considered enactment. In addition, dicta in a recent
case suggests that this Court., at least, would not react favorably to
a statutory solution of the problem."'
PRIOR RESTRAINT

Nebraska,7

In
the trial judge was faced with an explosive situation. After assessing the drawbacks of the traditional methods of
securing a fair trial, he resorted to a questionable means to curb the
excesses of the news media-prior restraint of publication. In light
of the problems involved with the traditional methods of mitigating
prejudicial publicity, the limited power of contempt, the lack of
statutory guidelines, and the absence of sanctions to enforce a voluntary code, the Supreme Court in Nebraska analyzed the concept
of prior restraint and defined its possible future in the fair trial/free
press debate.
Prior restraint stands apart as a judicial method of protection
against potentially damaging prejudicial publicity in that (1) it is
an extension of the court's authority beyond the courtroom and (2)
it seeks not to mitigate but to prevent a publication which might
later be deemed prejudicial. These two characteristics make prior
restraint unique. They also make prior restraint a constitutional
risk. As was evident in the contempt situations, once outside the
courtroom, judicial authority to sanction becomes doubtful. Attempts to exercise this authority and to directly control and restrain
an institution with fundamental constitutional mandates is an exercise of questionable validity. Until Nebraska, the judicial door was
not altogether closed on the concept of prior restraint. Indeed, in the
recent case of Branzburg v. Hayes,"8 the Court left open the possibility of some permissible use of prior restraint in a manner like that
eventually employed in Nebraska:
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press
is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathered in executive
session, and the meetings of private organizations. Newsmen have
no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster
when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited
from attending or publishing information about trials if such re86.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.

Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), stated: "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal,

but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it
cannot be legislated." Id. at 256.
87. 96 S.Ct. 2791 (1976).
88. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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strictionsare necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an
impartial tribunal."'
Prior to this apparent invitation, however, prior restraint was
never favorably regarded by the Court. Historically, the Court recognized that prior restraint, by definition, interfered with the editorial process of a free press before the otherwise valid exercise of a
first amendment right. The Court established early that any system
of prior restraint of expression bears a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity. 0 Thus, the restraining agency carries the
"heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint." 9
Normally, in cases involving prior restraint, the Court would
focus on the burden of proof needed to overcome this presumption
of invalidity. In only one case does it appear that a prior restraint
remained unchallenged and unquestioned. This case arose early in
the constitutional development of the right of free expression and
may have occurred in an era when the press was more timid in
2
confronting the judiciary. In that case, United States v. Holmes,
the court reporter related the opinion of Circuit Justice Baldwin:
"[Als the court perceives several persons apparently connected
with the daily press, whose object, we presume, is to report the
proceedings and evidence in this case, as it advances, the court
takes occasion to state that no person will be allowed to come
within the bar of the court for the purpose of reporting, except on
condition of suspending all publication till after the trial is concluded. On compliance with this condition, and not otherwise, the
court will direct that a convenient place be afforded to the reporters of the press."
The reporters expressed their acquiescence in this order of the
court, and the most respectful silence, on the part of the press,
prevailed during the whole trial. 3
Beyond this very unusual case, it has generally been thought that
the news media has a constitutional right of sorts to report on judicial proceedings. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court hastened to blunt its rather sharp attack on irresponsible journalism by
stating: "Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 684-85 (Emphasis added).
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

92.

26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).

93.

Id. at 363.
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reporting events that transpire in the courtroom.""4 Also, Mr. Justice Douglas noted in one of the contempt cases:
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is
public property. . . . Those who see and hear what transpired can
report it with impunity."
And yet, despite these far-reaching remarks, a restrictive or gag
order was never explicitly forbidden as an unconstitutional route to
a fair trial.
The actual gag order in Nebraska prohibited reporting of only
three matters: (1) the existence and nature of any confessions or
admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers; (2)
any confessions or admissions made to any third parties, except
members of the press; and (3) other facts "strongly implicative" of
the accused." In addition, the order was effective only to such time
as a jury was impanelled17
The Court, in analyzing this restrictive order, noted that, as in
earlier cases, such a restraint must bear a heavy burden of
justification and that this burden is not reduced by the temporary
nature of the restraint. 8 This is due to the belief that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."" Comparing
prior restraint to other infringements, the Court said criminal contempt situations at least afford the press the protection of appellate
review.
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of
criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior
restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.1°
Refusing to rule out this extraordinary remedy altogether, the
majority indicated that, in the future, a balancing test should be
applied to determine whether justification for a prior restraint exists:
[W]e must examine the evidence before the trial judge when the
order was entered to determine (a) the nature and extent of pretrial
news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to miti94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).
96 S.Ct. 2791, 2796.
Id. at 2795.
Id. at 2802.
Id.
Id. at 2803.
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gate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; (c) how effectively a 01
restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger.
In balancing these considerations and applying them to the facts

involved in Nebraska, the Court determined that the dangers of
prior restraint outweighed its benefits, that other adequate measures existed which could effectively protect the accused's right to
a fair trial, and that the corrective effects of the restraining order
were doubtful. When this analysis of prior restraint is applied to a
particular fact situation it leaves room for a future role of some prior
restraint, at least within the limits of the majority's balancing test.
It is precisely this open-ended case-by-case approach to the concept of prior restraint which Mr. Justice Brennan criticized in his
concurring opinion.0 2 The concurrance would totally bar the remedy
of prior restraint in the area of criminal reporting, allowing prior
restraint in only three types of cases: (1) restraints on publication
of obscene materials; (2) restraints on incitements to acts of violence
and (3) a limited
and the overthrow by force of orderly government;
03
restraint in the area of military security.
In the final analysis, Nebraska represents an attempt to restrict
the future use of prior restraint by the courts. It is not intended to
be an absolute bar. "[W]e need not rule out the possibility of
showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the
requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint."' 14 It could be
argued that the "requisite degree of certainty" is likely to surface
in only exceptional cases. Prior restraint remains a viable concept
for an exceptional trial-a trial of Brunno Hauptmann, a Lee
Harvey Oswald, or a Sirhan Sirhan.
CONCLUSION

"Trial by newspaper" is a judicially and journalistically recognized problem. It is also a problem which, although constitutionally
defined in Nebraska, remains to be solved. What the Warren Commission reported some twelve years ago is perhaps equally true
today:
The experience in Dallas during November 22-24 is a dramatic
affirmation of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2804.
2816 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Stewart, Marshall, J.J.).
2817-18 (Brennan, J., concurring).
2808.

19771

Fair Trial/Free Press

between the right of the public to be kept informed and the right
of the individual to a fair and impartial trial."5

Following Nebraska, courts will adopt a balancing approach to
uphold these two equally vital constitutional guarantees. To some
it may appear that the balance has been struck in favor of one
constitutional provision over another.' 6 And yet, the Supreme
Court, however idealistically or theoretically, has refused to choose
between the equally important rights of fair trial and free press.
Temporarily, the Court in Nebraska has struck a balance, achieved
an equilibrium, and reached the safety of a middleground.
CAROL

S.

ANTONELLI

105, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
at 242 (1964), noted in Barist, The FirstAmendment And Regulation Of PrejudicialPublicity-An Analysis, note 75 supra.
106. One such pessimist, or realist depending on one's point of view, is Telford Taylor,
who believes that the press has won the battle:
If the fair trial-free press issue in America be regarded as a conflict between the
claims of the bar and the press, an observer must conclude that the press has won
the game hands down. In part this victory has been handed to the press by the bar;
the votes of legislP+,rs (among whom are many lawyers) in 1831 for the federal
contempt stat ;te, and the votes of Supreme Court justices in 1941 in the Bridges
case . ...
Taylor, Crime R-porting And Publicity Of Criminal Proceedings, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 34, 5152 (1966).

